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mong the many books published on Kant, this one 
stands out. With a little over 150 pages the book is 
relatively short and it is written in a snappy style, 
which makes it a pleasure to read. It is tightly argued without 
falling into the ever more beguiling trap of attempting to 
transpose Kant’s thoughts into latter-day formal language. 
More importantly, it presents a convincing account of a cen-
tral (perceived) problem in Kant, regarding the ‘Refutation 
of Idealism’ (Refutation for short), and deals with it expe-
ditiously. Also, it is one of those very few books on Kant 
with which I happen to agree on most counts. This is 
especially significant as the author of the book, coming from 
an analytic background, doesn’t shy away from seeing Kant 
as the unfashionable idealist sans phrase that I also believe 
he is (although I am more positive about the philosophical 
tenability of Kant’s position than I think the author is). This 
has important repercussions for the way that Kant’s 
Refutation, usually regarded as Kant’s final rebuke to ideal-
ism, is expounded here. It thus makes the book an indispen-
sable read particularly for those interested in Kant’s criti-
cisms against idealism who desperately want him to be on 
the side of the realists (sans phrase). 
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he book is subdivided into four main chapters, the 
most important of which are chapter 1, on the nature 
of Transcendental Arguments (TA for short in the 
remainder of this review) and their supposed anti-sceptical 
thrust, and chapter 3, which deals with the Refutation in 
detailed scholarly fashion. Chapters 2 and 4 are on ‘The 
Transcendental Method’ and ‘The Transcendental as a 
Level of Discourse’ respectively, and concern more general 
issues related to Kant’s positive view of what constitutes a 
transcendental proof, namely to explain ‘the possibility of 
experiencing an object corresponding to some concept’ (51). 
Especially Stapleford’s delineation, in chapter 2, of a much-
neglected chapter in the first Critique, on the discipline of 
pure reason, is valuable. I shall focus on chapters 1 and 3, 
however, as they contain the meat of the book and will be 
seen by many as containing the more contentious views.  
In chapter 1, the author links the central aim of the book, 
to understand Kant’s transcendental method of proof, to the 
debate on TA, although one might, as the author notes, 
object to the substitution of the term ‘argument’ for ‘proof’, 
which namely is Kant’s own label for the procedure of 
transcendental analysis. The author points to a felt urgency 
that one detects in this debate, ‘as if the fate of philosophy’ 
depended on the success of the cogency of TA. (1-2) But 
Kant’s transcendental project might be very different from 
what one is usually looking for in Kant. Kant might not 
provide the answers that one wants. Stapleford thinks ‘that 
the main motivation for turning to Kant has been the almost 
universal confusion about what a transcendental argument 
is’. (3) One of the aggravating problems in the TA debate is 
the lack of ‘careful historical analysis’ (3). To remedy this 
defect, Stapleford seeks to know what Kant aimed for with 
his own TA, without anachronistically ‘applying any pre-
conceived notions of what would make such an argument 
effective or interesting’ (3). This, I think, is a very welcome 
indication of serious historically informed scholarship on 
Stapleford’s part. By contrast, among Anglophone commen-
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with a philosophically thematic focus, as if to highlight the 
old adage that we understand an author better than he did 
himself, often resulting in a curious mix of historical exposi-
tion and philosophical analysis, if not brazen ahistorical 
philosophical reductionism. As Stapleford rightly notes: 
‘We can certainly go beyond Kant, but in order to do that we 
first have to understand him.’ (5) This does not mean, of 
course, that we are not looking for arguments; we do after all 
want to understand Kant’s reasoning and are not concerned 
with historical details per se. Stapleford’s sensible views on 
the hermeneutics of interpretation should be taken to heart 
by all analytically inclined Kantians. 
The upshot of Stapleford’s reading of the central text part 
in which traditionally Kant’s supposed TA par excellence is 
located, the Refutation, is bound to be unwelcome, as 
Stapleford concludes that the Refutation is ‘not really meant 
to be a refutation of idealism in any sense that is likely to 
satisfy our realist instincts, but that it is much more a 
refutation of empiricism.’ (5) That Kant’s intention turns out 
not to ultimately prove the ‘existence of mind-independent 
entities’ (5), so the contrary of what is seen as the very 
purpose of TA, suggests the ‘unsuitability of the transcen-
dental method for securing any ontologically weighty 
conclusions’ (5) about an independent world of mind-
external objects. 
Stapleford addresses a series of responses to Barry 
Stroud’s famous objection to TA. According to Stroud, TA 
appear to neglect the distinction between a claim about how 
we think about the world and its objects and a claim about 
how the world is, and any anti-sceptical argument should be 
able to bridge the gap between how the world is and how we 
think the world is. Stapleford then suggests that ‘some form 
of verificationism such that statements about the world apart 
from any relation to us are strictly meaningless’ will render 
sceptical hypotheses regarding such a possible gap equally 
meaningless (9). But in that case the ‘verificationist principle 
[…] is doing all of the anti-sceptical work and not the 
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Commentators have since taken Stroud’s objection to be a 
direct challenge to Kant’s project, but Stapleford believes 
that ‘any reading of Kant on which Stroud’s objection is 
relevant must be based upon a misinterpretation of his 
critical programme’ (10).  
Turning to the Refutation itself, and specifically focussing 
on the question who is Kant’s explicit adversary there, 
Stapleford first argues that the Refutation is first of all a 
dialectical argument that has an anti-idealistic force and 
contains a transcendental proof of its main premise; but as 
for Kant no transcendental proof can be apagogic, the 
transcendental proof in the Refutation is not an indirect one 
(i.e. a reductio). ‘Only as directed against the problematic 
idealist […] does the argument become indirect’ (11). It is 
the dialectical argument, then, that has the polemical force 
against the opponent, whilst the transcendental argument 
‘furnishes […] a premise asserting a relationship of 
dependence between experience and one of its conditions’ 
(12). In other words, the argument of the Refutation as a 
whole can hardly be seen as transcendental. 
Stapleford subsequently expands on Robert Stern’s recent 
attempt to attenuate attempts to see the Refutation as 
strongly anti-sceptical by employing the distinction between 
epistemic and justificatory scepticism, so as to avoid 
Stroud’s objection. Kant’s Refutation is on that system-
atically revisionary basis to be seen as ‘directed against a 
normativist justificatory sceptic’ (14), the position where it is 
not questioned whether there truly is a world external to our 
minds, but whether it can be rationally legitimated that we 
believe there to be such a world. The opponent of the 
Refutation is then not someone of the Cartesian stripe, but 
more someone who thinks along Humean lines.  
Stapleford points out (16ff.) that, apart from Kant’s 
expressive statement that Descartes is his target, one reason 
that Hume cannot be the target of Kant’s Refutation is that at 
B276 Kant identifies the sceptical idealist as one who thinks 
we can only infer outer things, whereas Hume specifically 
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(17), meaning not that the inference were only doubtful, but 
rather it is wholly groundless. Furthermore, Stern’s norma-
tivist reading is clearly ‘a modern interpolation’ (21), as 
‘Kant just doesn’t talk about belief in the Refutation’ (21). 
Similarly, ‘Stern only discusses the fact that we perceive 
external objects immediately, when what the Refutation is 
really intended to establish is that we perceive outer appear-
ances, as objects, immediately.’ (23) Stern’s weakening 
move results in accepting that Kant can only prove that we 
know the world as it appears to us; an indefeasible proof 
against the sceptic cannot be given. Although Stapleford 
disagrees with Stern’s move generally, and he criticizes 
Stern’s neglect to explain Kant’s real intention (to prove 
immediate perception of objects), he concurs with Stern in 
believing that Kant was not ‘attempting to prove something 
about the world as a thing in itself’. (20) This is an important 
facet of Stapleford’s idealistic take on the Refutation, in 
which he differs radically from Paul Guyer’s prominent 
realist reading (on which more below). 
In the last two sections of the first chapter Stapleford 
outlines what he calls Kant’s ‘proto-verificationism’. He 
refers to what he calls Kant’s ‘framework principle’ (26). 
The framework meant here is ‘a set of concepts that makes 
possible either experience of or discourse about objects […]’ 
(26). Claims that are not about objects within this frame-
work are empty, although not meaningless (which on full-
fledged verificationism they would be). After providing 
textual support for this view, Stapleford subsequently 
connects the framework principle to Stroud’s objection that 
TA ‘could never prove anything about how the world is 
independently of us’ (31). At this point, Stapleford’s 
committed reading of Kant as an idealist sans phrase comes 
to the fore: ‘Kant’s proto-verificationism ensures that any 
sceptical challenges about the world as an object in itself are 
nothing to us, since the world in itself is precisely not an 
object of knowledge for us, according to Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism’ (31). The Stroudian objection against TA 
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would gladly admit to any obstinate sceptic insisting on an 
unexplainable discrepancy between mind and world that the 
forms of our experience ‘don’t correspond with the way the 
world really is independently of our experience’ (32). They 
only correspond to ‘dependent objects’, i.e. phenomenal 
objects or appearances. Hence, the ‘necessary correspond-
dence that Kant’s transcendental idealism establishes be-
tween a priori concepts and the phenomenal fabric of the 
world is of an anti-empiricist, rather than anti-sceptical 
description’ (33). The Refutation is, in other words, not 
directed against any hardline sceptic. 
 
n chapter 3, Stapleford addresses in great detail the argu-
ments that Kant himself presents in the Refutation and 
then later in drafts published as a set of Reflexionen in 
the Nachlass. His careful dissection of Guyer’s reading of 
pivotal passages that Guyer sees as supporting a realist 
reading is very illuminating and, to my mind, convincing. 
Guyer’s take on the Refutation is well known. He believes 
that in the Refutation, and then later even more clearly in the 
aforementioned Reflexionen, Kant argues for ‘full-bodied 
realism’ (62). Stapleford takes this view to task. Among 
other reasons for dismissing it is the fact that Guyer relies 
too heavily on the presumption that Kant was mistaken in 
regard to his initial idealist position (in particular in the 
Fourth Paralogism in the A-edition) and subsequently 
attempted to redress the mistake in the B-edition (the 
Refutation) and afterwards in the various drafts, which is 
first of all of course in conflict with Kant’s own view of the 
difference between the Critique’s A and B-versions as being 
merely of a presentational nature. More importantly, 
however, the Reflexionen on which Guyer relies most do not 
unambiguously support the realist reading, as Stapleford 
scrupulously shows, and allow a very different reading 
which in fact prohibits Guyer’s realist take.  
As had been noted by Kant’s contemporaries, in 
particular Pistorius, Kant prevaricates between two notions 
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logically distinct from us and one of object as ontologically 
distinct from us, what Kant labels as external in the 
‘transcendental’ (A373) or ‘intellectual sense’ (A367). As 
Pistorius pointed out perceptively in his review of the 
second edition of Kant’s first Critique, if the objects meant 
here are only phenomenologically distinct, then ‘the entire 
Refutation is a mere word play’ (68). Guyer though argues 
that other than in the 1781 Fourth Paralogism in the 1787 
Refutation Kant indeed seeks to show ‘the ontological 
independence [of objects] as the immediate condition of 
inner experience’ (69), even though they still depend on us 
for their being represented as spatial. Stapleford aims to 
rebut this reading and to show that on the evidence available 
Kant does not mean externally as in ‘ontologically indepen-
dent’. After considering and then quickly dismissing a more 
recent take from Guyer, Stapleford expounds in great detail 
Guyer’s arguments and scrutinizes his claims of textual 
support for the ontological reading. He shows that in the 
Reflexionen Kant only ever has the phenomenological 
independence of objects in mind. For example, regarding 
R6323 Stapleford asserts against Guyer’s reading of the 
evidence that there ‘is nothing here to suggest that the object 
qua thing in itself has any role to play with respect to the 
temporal ordering of experience.’ (74) Stapleford considers 
a Reflexion ‘on which Guyer relies most heavily’ (77), i.e. 
R6313, and concludes after carefully parsing the text that it 
does not unambiguously support Guyer’s reading and is in 
fact ‘sandwiched between two other[.] [paragraphs] that 
speak fairly clearly against it.’ (80) 
In the central section of chapter 3 Stapleford provides his 
own account of the Refutation proof; after a sketch of the 
general structure of the argument, Stapleford points out why 
Descartes is the target of the argument, circling around the 
possibility of the experience of the transcendental subject, 
that is, ‘how the a priori representation “I am” can become 
an object of knowledge, […] [that is,] can be given in 
intuition’ (94). The argument can then be called transcen-
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can be known a priori concerning my existence as an 
empirical object’. (95) The problem which ensues is that, on 
this reading, Kant has not ‘established that there is anything 
objective about experience at all’, and so the Refutation has 
no real clout as an argument against idealism, as it merely 
supplies an argument regarding what are the conditions for 
the experience of the self as an object, leaving unexplained 
the object’s reality.  
In the Fourth Paralogism a different argument against 
idealism can be found, namely one from sensory content; 
Kant there points out that, as Stapleford writes, ‘it is enough 
to refute idealism that there is a content or “material” 
component given to the cognitive faculties that is not itself 
produced by those faculties’ (96), implying that ‘empirical 
realism is beyond question’ (A375) (96-97). But again, ‘this 
strategy will be ineffectual against empirical idealists of 
either stripe, Cartesian or Berkeleyan’, as Stapleford subse-
quently points out (98), for there are resources available 
within empirical idealist theories that could account for the 
external provenance of sensory content.  
On what basis does Kant then have an argument against 
the empirical idealists? Stapleford goes on to show that, for 
Kant, object and hence empirical reality are ‘spelled out in 
terms of a priori connectedness of representations’; and, that 
which is real ‘is just that which is given in perception’ (101). 
In this context, Stapleford brings up something that mostly 
gets forgotten by commentators, namely that the Refutation 
is inserted, in the B-edition, into the section on ‘The 
postulates of empirical thinking in general’, where Kant 
expounds the conditions for the application of the categories 
of modality to empirical experience. The Refutation’s argu-
ment for ‘the dependence of inner experience on the 
existence of actual things outside of me’ fits in neatly with 
the Postulates’ account of ‘what it is for something to be 
actual [wirklich] in the empirical sense’ (101). Now it is 
perception, as Kant asserts, that will furnish actuality (102) 
and although Kant specifically allows for ‘counterfactual 
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not yet sufficiently differentiate Kantian idealism from the 
empirical idealists, as both ‘Berkeley and a moderate 
Cartesian solipsist could provide for the existence of objects 
in terms of the connection of possible perceptions with 
actual perceptions by means of associative laws’. (103) 
What does differentiate Kant’s transcendental idealism from 
empirical idealism is the a priori character of the connections 
of perceptions that purport to be about objects. The objective 
reality of our perceptions can only be had through concept-
ualization by virtue of the categories as providing that a 
priori connectedness, which ‘implies that the associationist 
account of objects espoused by pure empiricists must be 
wrong’ (104). It is the a priori connections among my 
perceptions that ‘render experience objective’ (105). In other 
words, ‘[r]eality, in the empirical sense, amounts to the a 
priori connectedness of given sensory content’ (105), 
whereby the a priori connectedness accounts for the 
transcendental component of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. But it also means, as Kant declares himself at 
A371, that objects are nothing but these connected 
representations, i.e., in Stapleford’s words, ‘nothing but sets 
of actual and possible representations between which a 
priori conceptual and intuitive relationships obtain’ (121), 
which accounts for the unmistakably idealistic bit of 
transcendental idealism. 
This leads Stapleford to read Kant’s assertion, in the 
Refutation, that ‘the perception of this persistent thing is 
possible only through a thing outside me and not through the 
mere representation of a thing outside me’ (B275) such that 
it concerns a contrast, not between ‘representation’ and 
‘thing’, which might suggest that a thing is meant that is 
ontologically distinct from us, as Guyer would have it, but 
between ‘mere representation’ and ‘thing’ as ‘object’ in the 
aforementioned sense of a priori connection of perceptions, 
which is the linchpin of Kant’s answer to the empirical 
idealist. That the subject of experience is then both that 
which conditions and is conditioned by the object might 




Dennis Schulting, Review of Scott Stapleford, 
Kant’s Transcendental Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason, 
KSO 2011: 105-115. 
Posted March 23, 2011 www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2011 Dennis Schulting & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 
 
114 
concluding section of chapter 3, that Kant distinguishes 
between transcendental and empirical consciousness, and 
the self-consciousness as a possible object of experience that 
is at issue in the premise in the Refutation is of course em-
pirical consciousness and not the transcendental subject that 
categorially determines any possible object of experience. 
Concluding, Stapleford observes, controversially but 
entirely consistently, that the Refutation ‘does not recant on 
[the Berkeleyan] position’ of the Fourth Paralogism, i.e., 
‘that the existence of objects needn’t be inferred since we do 
not have to go outside the contents of our own minds to 
reach them’; they ‘are immediately given as intra-mental 
entities’ (117). What the Refutation adds, and which reveals 
it to be directed against both the Berkeleyan and Cartesian, 
is making explicit a second sense of the immediate 
awareness of objects, namely as ‘already constituted 
according to a priori rules of connection’. This is how, 
Stapleford asserts, Kant ‘overturns transcendental realism 
and empirical idealism at one stroke’ (117). It might seem as 
if, on this account, Kant is just a Berkeleyan after all, 
although Stapleford clearly does not intend this to be so. 
What I take Stapleford to mean is that insofar as Kant, like 
Berkeley, denies bodies existing external to the mind — 
which is one of the conspicuous claims of the Fourth 
Paralogism (and a position that is confirmed in the 1783 
Prolegomena; §49; cf. §52c) — he rejects any form of 
transcendental realism, but to the extent that Kant, unlike 
Berkeley and in fact against him, argues for the empirical 
reality of bodies as a priori connected representations he 
rejects empirical idealism. So it is only in one respect that 
Kant’s position can be compared to Berkeley’s, the respect 
in which Kant truly must be considered an idealist, who 
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here are a few minor details which I would work out 
differently, but the overall resolutely idealistic pic-
ture Stapleford paints of Kant is the right one. It 
might be unwelcome to unrepentant realists, but I think his 
interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, in particular 
of the Critique’s Refutation, does justice to the historical 
Kant and is thus what a truly historically rigorous account 
that takes the arguments seriously should be like, whatever 
the arguments’ philosophical merits. I heartily recommend 
this well-researched monograph to specialists working on 
the Refutation and connected issues. It is to be hoped too 
that there will be a paperback reissue soon so that more 
students of the Refutation can affordably profit from its 
many insights.  
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